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Hulchanksi argued that when assessing urban change, 35 years is “not a long time” (Hulchanski 2010 p7). This article presents evidence that most neighbourhoods are slothful, rather than ‘dynamic’. Meanwhile, “a week is a long time in politics”, as the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson (in government 1964-70, 1974-76) once said. In practice, in neighbourhood regeneration policy which aims to reverse negative neighbourhood dynamics and encourage more positive change, few individual projects last as long as a decade. This mismatch between slothful neighbourhoods and dynamic expectations creates dilemmas in policymaking and in evaluation.




A huge amount has been written about neighbourhood change (e.g, see Lupton and Power, 2004 for one review and Megolugbe et al. 1996 for another). Scholars have explored types of change, causes of change, and the implications for policy towards neighbourhoods in decline, whether in terms of physical conditions, reputation, or the social status of residents. 
While theoretical approaches have attempt to produce theories that would apply to all neighbourhoods, the focus of empirical research has been on case studies of individual neighbourhoods, such as three in London (Butler and Robson 2001), or three in Scotland (Robertson et al. 2010), or on particular cities, such as Adelaide (Badcock and Cloher 1981), Toronto (Hulchanski 2010), and London (Atkinson 2000). There is also a very substantial literature covering the particular dynamics of gentrification and decline. The literature on gentrification has built up over fifty years, since Glass’s original 1964 definition, as a recent reader indicates (Lees et al., 2010). Studies have explored definitions, typologisation by phases, gentrification in cities across the world, and whether gentrification can be found outside cities (e.g, Phillips, 2009). However, this research is also generally based on case studies. While gentrifying cases generally appear to be in the minority of neighbourhoods in their cities, there is limited evidence on the extent of gentrification as a phenomenon, and the proportion of all neighbourhoods affected. Lees called for more research on the geography of gentrification (2000). 
Similarly, there are numerous studies of neighbourhoods in decline, dating from the identification of the ‘zone in transition’ and ‘twilight zone’ early in the history of urban sociology (Park et al. 1925, Grigsby et al. 1987), including more specific processes and areas such as those on the ‘spiral of decline’ in social housing estates (e.g,. Power and Tunstall 1995). In the US and the U.K. urban renewal policy is as old as the concept of gentrification, with pioneering examples in the 1960s including the Model Cities Program and the Urban Programme, and there is a substantial literature on the efforts to change twilight, declined or deprived neighbourhoods. 
Finally, there has been a substantial amount of work describing and typologising neighbourhoods. A private sector industry of neighbourhood typologies has evolved for marketing purposes. However, few typologies incorporate dynamics. Robson et al.’s typology of the 20% most deprived neighbourhoods in England according to the nature of population flows over one year was a rare example from the U.K. (2009, see also www.ppgis.manchester.ac.U.K. (​http:​/​​/​www.ppgis.manchester.ac.uk​)). Bailey et al. have extended this inquiry with a further typologisation by population dynamics (2013).
As Megubogle et al. said, “The literature is replete with models of neighbourhood change” (1996 p1790). These models cover types of trajectories, characteristics and in some cases causes of change. However, relatively little is known about how typical the neighbourhoods that change are, or the prevalence and extent of change across all neighbourhoods. This is an important empirical gap which means we lack contextual data for planning and assessing neighbourhood policy. This gap may be partly due to the lack of long-run data on neighbourhoods (e.g. Gregory et al. 2001; Meen et al. 2013), in turn due to changing administrative and political boundaries in many countries. U.S. and Canadian Census tract boundaries are a significant exception. 

The prevalence and rate of neighbourhood change
The extent of the literature on gentrification would lead us to hypothesise that at least a large minority of neighbourhoods might see increasing absolute or relative proportions of middle class residents, even over a single decade. Critics of regeneration policy have been concerned that whatever the exact theory of change or intent, regeneration may end up crating neighbourhood change through population movement rather than through change for the existing population, and that within the lifetime of projects what amounts to ‘state sponsored’ gentrification might occur (e.g. Uitermark and Bosker 2014). Similarly, the extent of literature on problematic social housing areas might lead us to hypothesis that these area form at least large minority if not a majority of social housing areas. However, in a study of the most deprived 30% of neighbourhoods over just one year, when they defined ‘gentrifier’ neighbourhoods as those which had more in-movers from more advantaged areas than others in one year, Robson et al.  found these areas made up just 8% of the total (2009). In Toronto, neighbourhood relative position in terms of resident income was largely stable over the short term. Only 9% of neighbourhoods showed consistent increases in income between each of five observations (1980-1990-1995-2000-2005), although 25% showed consistent decreases. A majority of neighbourhoods (60%) experienced change in average incomes relative to the city average of more than 20% only when a period of 35 years was examined (Hulchanksi 2010). Similarly, survey data show that the vast majority of tenants are satisfied with their homes and neighbourhoods, suggesting spirals of decline affect at most a small group.
On the other hand, another strand of discussion of neighbourhood dynamics in the literature emphasises long run stability in relative neighbourhood status over change. ‘Path dependency’ or lack of relative change is one of the major causal factors identified in explaining neighbourhood dynamics (e.g. Robertson et al. 2010, Meen et al. 2013). Reputation, levels of disorder and even the moral evaluation of particular neighbourhoods are “sticky” over time (Sampson 2009 p6). Commentary on area regeneration policy in the U.K. has noted that there is little change in the rankings of local authorities by relative deprivation (principally measuring resident socio-economic status) over the period in which deprivation indices have been calculated, and despite persistent policy. A number of empirical studies have found evidence of long run stability in relative neighbourhood status. For example, the relative social status of neighbourhoods in inner London in 1896 correlated highly with measures of deprivation for the same neighbourhoods nearly a century later in 1991, and could be used to predict twentieth century relative mortality rates (Dorling et al. 2000). In the large majority of travel-to-work sized areas (much larger than any definition of neighbourhoods), the relative level of infant mortality changed by no more than one quintile from 1891-1900 to 1990-92, with the same pattern for relative overcrowding and unskilled work (Gregory et al. 2001). 
Overall, it is not clear how much neighbourhood change goes on without policy, including in neighbourhoods which have declined and are deprived by some measure. Thus we don’t know how difficult a task of neighbourhood regeneration policy faces when it attempts to instigate change. Information on the prevalence and extent of neighbourhood change of importance to the study and theory of neighbourhood dynamics. It would also be of great practical importance, in planning, targeting and evaluating regeneration efforts. It is even of ideological importance, for example, in assessing the success or failure of social housing or state intervention as a whole.

The practical application of understandings of neighbourhood dynamics: neighbourhood regeneration policy
Understanding of neighbourhood change has direct implications for designing and assessing policy. All industrialised nations have experienced neighbourhood decline and, despite gaps in understanding about the prevalence of decline, its causes and what might reverse it, almost all have seen some policy intended to arrest or reverse this decline. These policies are based on the theory that absolute or relative negative change in physical and/or economic and/or socio-economic attributes of neighbourhoods can be reversed through the application of policy, including public and possibly private funding, by implication, during the lifetime of this policy.
The history - and the recent demise - of neighbourhood regeneration policy in England is presented here as an archetype. As an early industrialising and deindustrialising nation, the U.K. has long and extensive experience of neighbourhood decline. At least since the 1960s, and arguably since the Great Depression of the 1930s, there have been a variety of policies attempting to limit or reverse this decline. The most recent comprehensive policy effort was the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) for England. (Neighbourhood renewal and mixed communities policies have always operated slightly differently in Wales, and, to more differently in Scotland and Northern Ireland to policies in England, where the majority of the U.K. population live). The NSNR was launched in 1998 by the then new Labour government, and ran until 2010. The NSNR drew on thirty years of iterative development of policy, and was based on an unusual effort to review existing research and to incorporate researchers and senior practitioners into policymaking (e.g. Dabinett 2001, Cole and Reeve 2001). The foundational policy document, Bringing Britain Together (Social Exclusion Unit 1998) combined research evidence with strategy and detailed policy plans. It noted the increase in spatial concentration of poverty and social exclusion in Britain over the 1980s and 1990s. Drawing on research on neighbourhood change, it argued that these problems had structural causes (located outside or at greater spatial scale than the neighbourhood) that mainstream policies had failed these areas, and that past government regeneration efforts had been too small scale, poorly co-ordinated, and, significantly, too short-term. It pledged that within an extended period of '10-20 years’, ‘no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live' (Social Exclusion Unit 1998). This pledge did not promise to alter the ranking of any neighbourhood, but did imply that the ranks would be closer together - so close as to make no serious difference.
The NSNR set out 105 commitments, each with measurable indicators, including socio-economic targets such as employment, as well as service outcome measures such as burglary, school results, health, teen pregnancy, and jobs and environmental and housing improvements. The strategy combined reliance on macroeconomic growth and public service improvement nationwide, which were to be achieved by ‘mainstream’ policies, with targeted increases in opportunities in deprived areas, labour market changes and area renewal programmes, featuring spending on public space, infrastructure and housing, improved mainstream services and social services such as targeted training. The underlying theory of change was that the interventions would both improve the situation of and quality of life of existing, relatively deprived residents, and make it easier for areas to attract less deprived people, resulting in a double absolute and relative impact on area socio-economic mix. Compared to previous urban policy, programmes were longer, lasting up to ten years. 
Deprived areas were to be supported through two major national government funds. Firstly, the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) provided funds to the 88 or about one quarter of local authorities with the most deprived populations. Its budget of £0.8bn worked out at under £10 per resident per year, and even if the other public funds drawn into projects are included, spending only totalled about £20 per head per year (author’s calculations from AMION, 2010). NRF funds were spent by local authorities and local partners on a wide range of local projects on employment, crime, education and health (AMION, 2010). Secondly, the New Deal for Communities (NDC) targeted 39 highly deprived neighbourhoods of a few thousand people, all in areas where NRF funding was available. Each carried out over a hundred individual projects on employment, crime, housing, the environment, health, and education. NDCs reached less than 1% of the total English population. In the 39 areas where it operated they spent £1.7bn, or about £4,000 per head per year (Barry et al, 2010 p.6). Each of these policies would be expected to reduce local unemployment in absolute – and relative – terms, to help residents gain more middle class jobs, and to attract more middle class residents. 

Evaluating neighbourhood regeneration policy 
The NSNR and NDC and other related programmes operated for 1998-2008/10, a long time in both politics and regeneration policy. These programmes have been evaluated more thoroughly than any previous phases of British urban regeneration. Particular attention has been given to addressing additionality (whether spending produced effects in addition to what might have happened otherwise, particularly given economic growth) and displacement (whether effects in target areas were achieved partly or fully via the movement of less advantaged people out of the areas) (Dabinett 2001, Cole and Reeve 2001). 
The final evaluation of the NSNR found that differences within local authorities on employment (a socio-economic measure), and education and crime (which could be seen as service outcome measures) reduced 2001-2007 in most areas, even in those without policy interventions (AMION, 2010). However, these gaps reduced more in NSNR local authorities than in similar areas without these programmes (AMION, 2010). This demonstrates additionality, and improvement in relative position for these areas; it does not necessarily imply a change in ranking, however (there could be the same rankings of neighbourhoods albeit closer together). The final evaluation of the NDCs said that it had ‘transformed’ the few neighbourhoods it operated in (Batty et al, 2010 p.6). 32 of 36 indicators improved, including those on employment. The gaps between NDC areas, their local authorities and the national average reduced, and NDC areas saw more improvements than other comparator deprived areas (Batty et al, 2010 p.6). Again this demonstrates additionality and relative improvement, although not necessarily change in rankings. Nonetheless, ten years into the ‘ten to twenty years’ pledge period, gaps on the 105 targets had not fully closed (AMION 2010, Batty et al. 2010). In a national study of inequalities in 2010, Hills et al. (2010) recorded persistent substantial gradients by neighbourhood deprivation for socio-economic measures such as income and employment, and service outcome measures, such as health and education. 
In summary, the evaluations appear to show that neighbourhood renewal can have measurable and additional impact on neighbourhood socio-economics and on service outcomes. However, this may be smaller in scale than many might have hoped, small relative to continuing inequalities, and does not necessarily result in change in neighbourhood rankings. In a ‘glass half full’ interpretation, Palmer et al (2008, p19) said:
‘…the successes of the last ten years need to be stressed in order to confront the damaging idea that everything always gets worse and nothing can be done about it’.
However, some commentators argued for a change in direction. For example, by 2010, Hills et al argued that neighbourhood renewal ‘needs renewal’ (2010, p402). 
As it happened, the combination of a new Coalition government in 2010, a budget deficit and the impact of the Global Financial Crisis brought a radical change in direction. Despite the adverse effects of the crisis on employment, incomes and investment in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Tunstall with Fenton 2009, Hastings et al. 21012), the forty-year history of central-government supported neighbourhood regeneration ended abruptly. The NSNR was not extended or replaced. Several bodies associated with neighbourhood regeneration, such as the Regional Development Agencies which assembled land, have been closed. In summary, “neighbourhood renewal… is dead” (Lupton 2013 p66). It could be argued that this change occurred neither despite nor because of the evidence of the results of the policies, but for pragmatic or ideological reasons. However, the absence of more dramatic evidence of large scale ‘transformation’ within typical policy time spans may be a contributory factor. 

[insert Box 1 about here]
Box 1: Time scales: Political, economic
2 years 	Gordon Brown as U.K. Prime Minister (2008-10)5 years 	Maximum (now fixed) U.K. Parliamentary Term10 years	Lifetime of NDCs (1998-2008)11 years	Tony Blair as U.K. Prime Minister (1997-2008)11 years	Economic cycle recession to recession (1981-1992)’10-20’ years	Period over which NSNR was to have effects16 years	Economic cycle from end of recession to start of recession (1992-                         2008)


The context for making and evaluating neighbourhood policy: Neighbourhood dynamics in England and Wales, 1985-2011
This paper now introduces evidence of long-term neighbourhood dynamics across all neighbourhoods in England and Wales, which allows us to assess the prevalence and extent of relative neighbourhood change. It aims to explore whether neighbourhoods are dynamic or slothful and to quantify the task policy sets itself when attempting to instigate change. It compares neighbourhood rankings over time, which allows us to compare the trajectories of different neighbourhoods over different time periods, even where national averages change over time. The time period includes the recession of the early 1990s and the more recent Global Financial Crisis.
Neighbourhood dynamics have been described and measured in terms of house prices and housing condition and other physical and economic characteristics, but there is an established tradition of assessing neighbourhood position and neighbourhood dynamics though population variables (Grigsby et al. 1987). The analysis is based on data for two population variables of interest to those concerned with neighbourhood change and neighbourhood regeneration: a) unemployment and b) social class. Employment, unemployment and economic activity rates are important as indicators of the absolute and relative position of neighbourhoods and of neighbourhood trajectories. They are indirect indicators of the individual and collective income in neighbourhoods, and of levels of real capital and social capital, and material deprivation, and are seen as direct measures of the need for regeneration. For example, in the UK, labour market measures form one ‘domain’ of the Index of Multiple Deprivation used in England and Wales (and similar indices for Scotland and Northern Ireland) to target areas for regeneration policy. Absolute and relative proportions of residents of different classes are also important as indicators of the absolute and relative position of neighbourhoods and of neighbourhood trajectories. They are direct indicators of the social status of neighbourhoods, indirect indicators of their individual and collective income, real capital and social capital, and indirect indictors of levels of material deprivation. Secondly, changes in the class mix of neighbourhoods is a direct indicator of gentrification (Glass 1969, Smith 1986 and Lees et al. 2008). The class mix of neighbourhoods has been discussed if not formally used as measure of the need for and outcomes of ‘mixed communities’ regeneration policy (e.g. Lupton et al. 2010). 

Each of these two variables is examined, pragmatically, for the longest time period with consistent data available. This is 1985-2005 for unemployment and 2001-2011 for social class. 


a)Neighbourhood dynamics in England 1985-2005 in terms of relative rates of unemployment benefit claims
Data and methods
This analysis is based on administrative data on the numbers of people claiming unemployment benefit. ‘Job-Seeker's Allowance’ is a benefit available to unemployed working-age adults in the U.K. who are available for and ‘actively seeking’ work. It is either means-tested, or paid for by past National Insurance (payroll tax) contributions. Until 1997, the claimant count was an official measure of unemployment. However, as eligibility for benefits has been subject to numerous alterations (and, arguably, to political manipulation). Since the late 1990s, data to match the ILO definition of unemployment has instead been gathered from estimates of unemployment derived from continuous surveys like the Labour Force Survey. From the late 1990s, the claimant count was significantly lower than the ILO measure of unemployment. However, this administrative data is attractive because it is available for repeated observations (monthly or annually), for a long time period – from 1985 to the present, and for small areas. 
Alex Fenton created annual working-age population estimates for ‘postcode sectors’ areas for 1985-2001 by matching postal boundaries with small 1981, 1991 and 2001 Census areas. These population estimates can be used to establish claimant rates for administrative neighbourhoods, called ‘postcode sectors’. There are a total of about 8,000 of these areas in England and Wales, and in 2001 they had an average working age population of about 4,000. Alex Fenton excluded 896 sectors which had small working age populations at one or more Census point (fewer than 1000 people). These were typically city centre commercial zones. He smoothed population changes between 1981-1991-2001 census dates. From 2001 he used ONS annual Small-Area Population Estimates. There were 6140 ‘neighbourhoods’ in England and Wales in the final dataset, which could be used to create monthly or annual claim rates for small areas. Each year 1985-2005, each postcode sector was assigned to a decile according to the relative level of unemployment benefit claims

Neighbourhood dynamics in terms of relative rates of unemployment benefit claims
The following table shows the trajectories of all neighbourhoods with consistent data in England and Wales in terms of the decile they fitted into in 1985 and in 2005. 

[insert Table 1 about here]

Over 20 years 1985-2005, absolute levels of unemployment claims fluctuated markedly. For example, in the decile of areas with the highest rates they zigzagged from 17% of all adults of working age in 1986, to 9% in 1991, to 15% at a recession peak in 1993, and 4% in 2008 at the low point before the Global Financial Crisis, as the economy changed. However, there was much less change once relative positions are examined. The majority of neighbourhoods were at the same place or a very similar place in 1985 and 2005 in the national ranking (Table 2). 

[insert Table 2 about here]

Prevalence, speed and extent of change were all very limited. Relative patterns did not appear to change in the way that absolute ones did. The largest group of neighbourhoods, almost a third of the total (34%), experienced no change in decile over the ten year period. 20% of neighbourhoods saw an increase by just one decile, while 18% saw a decrease by just one decile, so a further 38% saw change in either direction of one decile. Thus a total of 72% of all neighbourhoods saw either no change, or a change of one decile only, insufficient for the neighbourhood to be said to have ‘transformed’ in socio-economic terms, and in all probability not readily noticeable on the ground, particularly given the marked fluctuations in absolute claimant rates over this time. If concentrations of unemployment create knock-on disadvantage or are symptoms of it, it appears that 10-20 years is not enough to see a serious reduction of this disadvantage.
There was particularly little change for areas which started with the highest unemployment claims. Of the 614 postcode sectors in England and Wales which were in the highest decile for claims in 1985, 400 (65%) were in the top decile again in 2005 (although they may have experienced variation between these dates). This represents an ‘escape rate’ from this group of 1.7% per year. Only 8 (1.9%) had below average claim rates in 2005. This represents an ‘arrival’ rate in this half of the distribution of 0.06% per year.

Of the 614 postcode sectors in England and Wales which were in the highest claims decile in 1985, the mean decile throughout the entire period 1985-2005 was 1.3. 259 (42%) were in the top decile for every year 1985-2005. 257 more were only in the top two deciles. Only 98 (16%) were ever in the third decile or above. Only 13 (2%) had experienced below average JSA rates at any time to 2005. 
Even more dramatically, there was also very limited change for areas with high unemployment over a period of 70 years. Again, relative patterns did not appear to change in the way that absolute ones did. We examined local authority (not neighbourhood) areas which had high unemployment in 1934, and which had been identified as ‘Depressed Areas’ in the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934. This commenced a form of regional policy, which could be seen as a forerunner of the regeneration policy which began in the 1960s. Of the 251 contemporary neighbourhoods identifiable as located in ‘Depressed Area’ local authorities, only 27 (11%) were in the top decile for unemployment claims in 2005. However, this only means an ‘escape rate’ from this group of 1.3% per year. Only 49 (19%) had below average JSA rates in other words an ‘arrival’ rate in this half of the distribution of 0.3% per year.


b) Neighbourhood dynamics in England 2001-2011 in terms of relative proportions of ‘middle-class’ residents
Data and methods
This analysis was based on data in the 2001 and 2011 Censuses of population for England, the first to offer small area data for boundaries consistent over time. Small neighbourhoods were ranked according to the proportion of ‘middle class’ residents they had in 2001 and in 2011. Small neighbourhoods were defined as Lower-level Super Output Areas (LSOA), with an average population of 1,500 (smaller than postcode sectors). The analysis excluded neighbourhoods whose boundaries changed 2001-2011. Although as areas with population size change, they might be interesting, they formed just 2.5% of the total. ‘Middle class’ residents were defined as those aged 16-74 whose current or most recent employment was in categories 1 and 2 according to the National Social and Economics categorisation (for 2001, Large employers and higher managerial occupations/Higher professional occupations and Lower managerial and professional occupations, and for 2011 Higher Managerial, Administrative and Professional Occupations and Lower Managerial, Administrative and Professional Occupations). This definition has been used in other studies of gentrification (e.g. Davidson and Lees 2010). For both 2001 and 2011, the ranking of neighbourhoods was divided into ten deciles, with decile 1 having the lowest proportion of middle class residents and decile 10 the highest. 

Neighbourhood dynamics in terms of relative proportions of ‘middle-class’ residents
The table below shows the 2001 and 2011 decile for individual neighbourhoods in England and how they compared to each other (Table 3). 

[insert Table 3 about here]

Again, as in the case of the employment measure (which related to a longer time period but larger neighbourhoods), the majority of neighbourhoods were at the same place or a very similar place in 2001 and 2011 in the national ranking according to the proportion of middle class residents. Again, relative patterns did not appear to change in the way that absolute ones did.
The table below shows the number of neighbourhoods experiencing different extent of changes 2001-2011 according to the relative proportion of ‘middle class’ residents (Table 4).

[insert Table 4 about here]

The largest group of neighbourhoods, almost half of the total (47%), experienced no change in decile over the ten year period. Although there was on average a slight increase in the proportion of middle class residents in these areas, it only reflected national trends. A further 22% of neighbourhoods saw an increase by just one decile, and 19% saw a decrease by just one decile. Thus a further 41% saw change in either direction of one decile. Thus a total of 88% of all neighbourhoods saw either no change, or a change of one decile only. This change might not be sufficient to be directly or indirectly noticeable on the ground over a ten year period. Only a small minority of neighbourhoods experienced more ‘marked’ change. 
Only 6% of neighbourhoods experienced an increase in the proportion of middle class residents enough to change their position by two deciles or more. These might be described as ‘gentrifying’ neighbourhoods. However, it could be argued that the ‘classic’ conception of a gentrified neighbourhood is one in which the ‘gentry’ initially formed a below average proportion of the population but have come to form a proportion above average. If we define it in this way, the total number of neighbourhoods in England experiencing ‘classic gentrification’ between 2001 and 2011 was 791, or 2% of the total. Thus ‘gentrification’, while occupying a very important place in urban studies literature, is an unusual process, and gentrifying neighbourhoods are an atypical and very small minority. Similarly, only 6% of neighbourhoods experienced decline, no change or limited increases (against the national trends of an increasing middle class) in the proportion of middle class residents enough to change their position by two deciles or more. These might be described as the ‘declining’ neighbourhoods. 

Over 10 years 2001-2011, there was little change for areas with very low proportions of middle class residents. Of the 3,168 LSOAs in England which were in the lowest decile for middle class residents in 2001, 2,447 (or 77%) were in the lowest decile again in 2011 (although they may have experienced variation between these dates). This represents an ‘escape rate’ from this group of 2.3% per year (a faster rate than for the employment variable). Only 4 (0.1%) had above average rates of middle class residents in 2011. This represents an ‘arrival’ rate in this half of the distribution of 0.01% per year (a slower rate than for the employment variable). Of the 3,168 LSOAs in England which were in the lowest decile for middle class residents in 2001, 3,075 or 97% were only in the top two deciles, and only 3% were ever in the third decile or above. Thus neighbourhoods appeared to be largely ‘slothful’, even in a period that included the Global Financial Crisis.

Setting regeneration policy in the national context of ‘slothful’ neighbourhoods: The case of change in unemployment benefit claimant rates for New Deal Communities areas
Change in claimant rates for the New Deal for Communities areas provide an example of the potential contribution of data on neighbourhood dynamics. A postcode sector (the area used in analysis above) is about the same population size as a New Deal for Communities area, but slightly smaller. For 36 of the 39 NDC areas, a single postcode sector proxy could be confidently identified. 
Looking at the pre-policy context, 26 (72%) NDC areas were in the top decile for claimant rates in 1998, when the NDC began. Thus, as intended, the NDC was generally targeting a handful of the hundreds of neighbourhoods in the highest claimant rate decile. However, generally, NDC was targeting areas which had experienced not only high unemployment just at one point but sustained high claim rates over time (Table 5).

[insert Table 5 about here]

24 (66%) NDC post code sectors had been in the top decile for JSA claims in 1985. There was some variation in where in the top decile these areas were, and 33% of NDC post code sectors were not in the top decile, so despite being a small group, NDC areas were not uniformly very extreme. 18 (50%) had been in the top decile every year in the twelve year period 1985-1997. 31 (86%) were in only the top two deciles 1985-1997. Only 5 had experienced third decile or better at least once 1985-97. 
Did neighbourhoods’ relative JSA claim rates change during the NDC policy? No. All those NDC postcode sectors which had been continuously in the top decile before the scheme 1985-97 were so during and after 1998-2005 too. 24 NDCs were in the top decile for every year 1998-2005. The mean position for all NDCs 1998-2005 was the same as 1985-97. 28 NDC post code sectors were in the top decile for JSA claims in 2005, when the NDC was in its final years.
Considered as additional evaluative material, this data on long-term neighbourhood trajectories nationwide provides a negative assessment of NDCs’ ability to change neighbourhoods’ ranking. It perhaps provides a more negative assessment than the far more complex evaluations which recognised multiple aims and drew on multiple indicators and sources of evidence (e.g. Batty et al. 2010).  However, considered as contextual material, this data on long-term neighbourhood trajectories nationwide demonstrates how rare 'escapes' from prolonged relatively high claimant rates (or low middle class population rates) are. This emphasises the difficulty of the task being set for regeneration policy, and the value of the limited changes produced. While results of NDC appear disappointing, of the 241 non-NDC areas continuously in the top decile 1985-97, not a single one ‘escaped’ during the NDC period 1998-2005, even for one year. Thus, change of this extent (a whole decile) appeared impossible or very unlikely without policy, and policy was setting itself a great challenge in attempting to achieve this kind of transformative change.

[insert Box 2 about here]





The implications of evidence on neighbourhood change 
This evidence supports the ‘slothful’ school of research above the ‘dynamic neighbourhoods’ school. More research would be valuable on the causes of lack of change, and determination of which neighbourhoods change and which don’t, to complement the extensive literature on causes of change and descriptions of path dependency. We need to know which neighbourhoods break from the path and which don’t. In addition, there are implications for policy design and evaluation. These long-term data on neighbourhood trajectories can be used to provide important additional evaluation material and context material for neighbourhood regeneration policy. Both sets of analysis above confirm the arguments and limited empirical evidence from the literature that suggests long-term stability in neighbourhood relative status is the norm, and that marked change in neighbourhood rankings is rare. The data extends arguments and evidence in the literature by quantifying the prevalence and extent of change for two important variables.
Given the low ‘escape rates’ from high relative unemployment and low relative middle class populations, even through periods of recession and Global Financial Crisis, and given the size and scope of typical regeneration projects, significant change in relative socio-economic position can only been realistically predicted for the most deprived areas over a period of multiple decades, which is very long by the standards of politics and regeneration policy to date.
Significant change over significant numbers of neighbourhoods takes place over time periods longer than standard political or policy time. This might have provided alternative viewpoints on NSNR for commentators and for policymakers of all parties. In summary, we shouldn’t expect many neighbourhoods to ‘transform’ in relative socio-economic status spontaneously in the short and medium term. We shouldn’t expect policy aimed at the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods to ‘transform’ them in socio-economic terms a similar time period, although improvements to housing consiton, services and public spaces may be achievable. Thus perhaps both Labour and Coalition policymakers who became frustrated with the speed of results from neighbourhood renewal policy in England over the 2000s were being too hasty in their judgements. 
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Table: 1: Claimant rate decile in 1985 and in 2005 for all neighbourhoods in England and Wales 1985-2005
	2005 decile















Table: 2: Number and percentage of neighbourhoods experiencing different changes in relative proportion of unemployment benefit claimants, England and Wales, 1985-2005












Note: *= less than 1%


Table: 3: Percentage of neighbourhoods experiencing particular trajectories in terms of class, England 2001-2011
	2011 decile











Note: Includes only neighbourhoods with unchanged boundaries 2001-2011; total of 31,675 neighbourhoods; rounding means columns and rows may not sum exactly to 100%


Table 4: Percentage of neighbourhoods experiencing relative change in the proportion of ‘middle class’ residents, England, 2001-2011










Note: *= less than 1%


Table 5: Job seekers’ allowance claimant rate for NDC areas (NDC operated 1998-2008) 
	1985	1998	2005	Every year 1985-1997 (before policy)	Every year 1998-2005 (during policy)
Highest rate decile	24	26	26	18	24
Other	12	10	10	18	12





7 years 	Of the 24 NDC areas continuously in the top decile for claimant rates in the decade before NDC policy started (1985-97), not a single one ‘escaped’ during the NDC period 1998-2005, even for one year

Of the 241 non-NDC areas continuously in the top decile for claimant rates in the decade before NDC policy started (1985-97), not a single one ‘escaped’ during the NDC period 1998-2005, even for one year

10 years 	Gaps between neighbourhoods on wide range of indicators, including employment, reduced more in NSNR local authorities than in similar areas without these programmes (AMION, 2010). 

Gaps between NDC areas, their local authorities and the national average on wide range of indicators, including employment, reduced, and NDC areas saw more improvements than other comparator deprived areas (Batty et al, 2010 p.6). 

0.1% of small neighbourhoods in England and Wales in the decile with lowest proportion of middle class residents achieved average levels

20 years 	2% of neighbourhoods in England and Wales in the decile with highest unemployment benefit claims experienced average rates

35 years	Majority of neighbourhoods in Toronto experienced change in average income of 20% or more of city average; 9% experienced continuous improvement in relative position over 5 observations (Hulchanski 2010)

70 years 	19% of small neighbourhoods in 1934 ‘Depressed Areas’ in  England and Wales achieved below average unemployment benefit claim levels

c90-100 years Minority of larger areas changed by more than one quintile in 
relative status on infant mortality, overcrowding, and low skilled employment (Gregory et al. 2001)
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